ABSTRACT: Copyright protection extends to “original” works. The
adjective “original” here means a work that originated with its
purported author, and is not meant to impute any novelty
requirement to copyright law. However, case law and literature
offer up several odd examples where two individuals have
independently created identical works of art. The theory
underlying copyright law requires that, because each work
originated independently from separate authors, each work be
independently copyrightable. Applying this strict, objective
standard of originality to the transformative arts, we begin to
see new possibilities for grounding copyrights in parodies and
satires. Under current law, parodies escape infringement of
their target works through the “fair use” exception to copyright
law, while satires frequently do not. However, this essay
argues that, under a strict interpretation of the originality
standard, parodies and satires alike can be considered
independently created works of art that are not derivative of
(and hence not infringing) their target works. This essay
suggests the application of a new standard of ascertainably
different meanings when determining whether one work infringes
upon a similar work.
ARTICLE:
Protecting Menard’s Quixote: A Return to the Strict Originality
Standard in Copyright Law

Central to the issue of copyright protection is the
question of originality.1

U.S. law protects “original works of

authorship” but little is done to define this phrase.2

Taken in

its barest form, a work is original if it originated with its
purported author.

Case law shies away from judging the

creativity inherent in a work, and imposes a more “objective”
standard of originality.

But this objective standard has some

surprising consequences when taken to its logical limit.
1

2

The

Howard Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55-SPG Law &
Contemp. Probs. 3, 6.
17 U.S.C.A. §103(a)

admittedly extreme cases discussed below force us to reexamine
our notions of authorship and originality.

Properly understood,

these two notions suggest that derivative works such as parody
and satire may best be considered not as fair use “exceptions”
to copyright law, but (in appropriate cases) as original works
of authorship protected in their own right.

To that end I argue

that, in addition to considerations of similarity and access,
courts should consider evidence of independent meaning to
determine when a work is original.
Case One: Hand’s Magical Poet
Copyright inheres in “original works of authorship”, and
much hinges upon the definition of “original”.

Does the word

define a work that possesses “novelty or freshness of style or
character”?3

Or does it merely mean “made, composed, or done by

the person himself”?4

The first case we shall consider was put

forward in a famous thought experiment by Learned Hand.

“[I]f

by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they
might of course copy Keats's.”

5

The implications of Learned Hand’s words are quite
puzzling.
3
4
5

First, that someone might by mere accident stumble

Oxford English Dictionary, “Originality” 2.a.
Oxford English Dictionary, “Original” 4.b.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1936).
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upon the very words used by Keats is so improbable as to be
absurd.

But, granting this unlikelihood, more absurdity

follows: Learned Hand suggests that this serendipitous poem
could be copyrighted as a work somehow distinct from Keats’s,
even though the two poems might be word-for-word identical.
Though Keats’s poem, being in the public domain, might be freely
distributed on the internet, the new poem is protected.

Of

course, this raises the question: how are we to ascertain
whether a particular copy is attributable to Keats or to Hand’s
magical author?

But this question leads us down the wrong path,

Hand seems to suggest: the objective originality of a work may
not always be easy to establish, and may not present us with
copyrights that are easy to enforce, but it provides us with the
philosophical basis and constitutional justification for our
copyright system.
The result may seem counter-intuitive.

Imagine entering a

bookstore to find a newly published copy of Jurassic Park,
written by Hand’s magical author.

The author had been stranded

on a deserted island since 1982, and had, by an incredible
chance, written a novel word-for-word identical to Michael
Crichton’s famous book.

Under U.S. Patent law, the inventor of

a device is protected against those who later create the same
device independently.

However, there is no such protection

under U.S. Copyright law.
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In this odd situation, Michael

3

Crichton has no cause of action—legally, his copyright has not
been infringed.
What is the likelihood of “accidentally” recreating

Jurassic Park?
miniscule.

The answer, of course, is smaller than

As David Nimmer notes, “sorcery aside, people do not

adventitiously come up with original works mimicking the full
text of great romantic poems.”6

Nevertheless, to say the event

is incredibly unlikely is not to say that it is impossible.

If

someone were to publish an adventitious Jurassic Park, the
courts (and the literary world) might have a hard time believing
that the work was original—but this is a question of fact.

The

question of law is straightforward: if it is found to be
original, the adventitious Jurassic Park does not infringe.7
Hand’s thought experiment cuts to the heart of copyright:
it is not novelty that qualifies a work for copyright
protection, but the “reach[ing] into the subjective range of
interiority, thereby producing words … fixed in a tangible
medium of expression.”8

This phrase, suggested by David Nimmer,

plays an important role in what follows, so an understanding of
its meaning is crucial.
6

7

The subjective range of interiority

David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 Houston Law Review, 1,
39.
It is amusing to imagine the copyright problems that would arise over the
serendipitous Jurassic Park. While Crichton could license the movie
rights of his novel to Universal, the adventitious author could
legitimately license the rights of his novel to Sony. Or, he could
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consists of the mental, and some might say spiritual, life of an
individual.

It is necessarily subjective, since only the

individual has access to it.

It consists, in part, of an

individual’s feelings, beliefs, ideas, emotions, vague
sensations, and half-baked notions.

To dive into this realm

and, influenced by what is there, return with a fixed, objective
expression of the objects of this metaphysical realm, is to
become an author.
Copyright protects only against “copying”, and courts
wisely note that an independent creation is not a copy.9

Hand

himself implies that Keats’s Ode and the later Ode are actually

two different poems, and suggests that copyright protection is
available for the latter, but not for the former, public domain
poem.10
How can two poems that are word-for-word identical be
different?

The most straightforward answer is, because the two

poems have different origins.

Works of art (protectable ones,

at least) are expressions, and expressions must, by definition,
be expressions of some agent.11

Keats’s Ode is an expression of

Keats’s subjective range of interiority, while the Ode written

underbid Crichton, causing Universal to buy the rights to his novel
instead of Crichton’s.
8
Nimmer, supra, at 39.
9
Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54, Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
10
Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
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by Hand’s author is an expression of his subjective range of
interiority.

It is because each poem originates with different

authors that each poem is original.
The same cannot be said of a pirated Ode.

When I

plagiarize Keats, the result of my plagiarism cannot be said to
be an expression of my owns ideas and experiences—my own
subjective impressions.

Rather, my plagiarized poem remains an

expression of Keats’s subjective realm.
A difference in origin is one crucial difference between
Keats’s poem and the poem by Hand’s “magical” author.
be another difference.

There may

Though the forms of the two poems happen

to be identical, their intended meanings need not be.

For

example, though each poem uses the phrase:
“Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness,
Thou foster-child of silence and slow time,”12
Keats may have meant to express admiration for the enduring
beauty of art, while Hand’s fortuitous composer may have felt
frustration at art’s inability to capture the ever-changing
vagaries of life.

This difference in intended meaning arises

due to the difference in origin; in other words, the meanings of
the poems differ precisely because the poems are expressions of
differing subjective impressions.
11

Of course, the average reader

More precisely: Expression, II.2.a. “The action of expressing or
representing (a meaning, thought, state of things) in words or
symbols;” Oxford English Dictionary.
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may not pick up on such differences, but literary critics often
consider the social contexts and life experiences of authors
when interpreting a work.

Critics may analyze the two poems

quite differently, depending on the contexts of the authors’
lives.
It is important to emphasize that a text is not by itself
an expression, and alone it is no more deserving of copyright
protection than an idea.

Underlying copyright law is the divide

between syntax and semantics, between form and content.

A work

of authorship is created not merely by typing words on a page,
but also by attributing meaning to those words.

A monkey does

not become an author merely by punching keys on a typewriter,
even if the monkey miraculously manages to type out coherent
sentences.

And in just the same way, a drunken blind man

pounding wildly on a keyboard is not authoring anything.

To

qualify as an author, one must at least have an intent to
express a subjective internal state.13
Of course, form and content must both be present for a work
to receive copyright protection; neither one is protectable
independently.

Usually, the emphasis is placed on the “form”

requirement: an idea alone (i.e., content without form) cannot
12

13

John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in The Odes of John Keats, p. 114 (Helen
Vendler ed., 1983).
Nimmer, supra, at 204-205. “Intent is a necessary element of the act of
authorship,” (emphasis in original).
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be copyrighted.14

But the “content” requirement exists as well:

a random or arbitrary series of symbols cannot be protected.15
The juxtaposition of words can express an idea, but it doesn’t
necessarily do so: the mere alphabetical ordering of telephone
listings is not copyrightable expression, since there is no
content to be expressed.16
Why does a fortuitous Jurassic Park, written by Hand’s
magical author, fail to infringe upon Michael Crichton’s
copyright?

To sum up, the two novels originate from separate

attributions of intended meaning to a set of symbols placed on a
page.

To create an “original work of authorship,” an individual

must (1) select the symbols to be included in the work, and (2)
intend that the symbols have a meaning or effect, that emerges
from the individual’s subjective range of interiority.
Case Two: Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote
The second case is described in great detail by Jorge Luis
Borges in his short story Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.
14

15

In order for an author to “infringe” upon Shakespeare’s character of Sir
Toby Belch, “it would not be enough that for one of his characters he
cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the
household….These would be no more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the
play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s Doctrine of
Relativity.” Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121
(2d Cir. 1930).
“Mitel’s arbitrary assignment of particular numbers to particular functions
and its sequential ordering in registers and descriptions ‘lack[] the
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into
copyrightable expression.’” Mitel, Inc. v Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366,
1374 (10th Cir. 1997), quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 362. See also Stuart
Ent. Inc. v. American Games Inc., Civil Action No. 1-96-CV-70036 (S.D.
Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), denying protection to the design of Bingo cards,
as described in Nimmer, supra, at 31.
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Menard, an obscure (and fictitious) French author living at the
turn of the century, had the “admirable intention … to produce a
few pages of text which would coincide—word for word and line
for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.”17

After years of

effort and draft after draft of text, Menard managed to produce
“the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of Don

Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two.”18
What was Menard’s “admirable intention”?

Quixote?

To copy Don

If so, why did it take so much time and effort, so

many thousands of torn up pages, to replicate such a small
amount of Cervantes’s text?

And why does Borges call this work

“perhaps the most significant of our time”?19
Borges is quick to point out that Menard “never
contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he did
not propose to copy it.”20

Rather, Menard proposed to “reach the

Quixote through the experiences of Pierre Menard.”21

Menard

intended to write his own novel, stemming from his own life
experiences and social context—from his own subjective realm of
interiority.
16
17

18
19
20
21

He wanted to convey his own unique outlook and

Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in Labyrinths,
p.39 (Donald Yates, ed. 1964). There is most certainly a distinction
to be drawn between Borges the author and Borges the narrator/critic of
the story. However, since the distinction is irrelevant in the present
context, I shall ignore it.
id., at 39
id., at 38-39.
id., at 39.
id., at 40.
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perspective on life.

But he wanted to see if he could express

his unique perspective using the very same words the Cervantes
used centuries before.

In Menard’s own words, “[m]y solitary

game is governed by two polar laws.

The first permits me to

essay variations of a formal and psychological type; the second
obliges me to sacrifice these variations to the ‘original’ text
and reason out this annihilation in an irrefutable manner.”22
Menard’s text derives its meaning entirely from his own
subjective experience23; this is the point of his first law,
which all authors employ.

“To essay variations of a formal and

psychological type” is the first step in writing anything; it is
practically synonymous with Nimmer’s concept of “reach[ing] into
the subjective range of interiority.”24

All authors will

consider many different ways of expressing a particular feeling,
idea, or aesthetic impression, before settling on the phrase
that best captures the author’s fancy.
The second law is meant to be a formal limitation upon the
first, and it can be considered in two parts.

The first part

“obliges [Menard] to sacrifice these variations to the
22

23

24

id., at 41. Note Borges’s use of scare quotes around the word “original”.
Borges recognizes (as does the fictional Menard) that both Quixotes
are, in fact, originals; despite their identical formal structures they
are different works.
We will assume this is true, for it is what Menard sought to achieve. Of
course, it is possible that he cheated, but we will for the time being
put our faith in his integrity, and put off our skeptical demands for
proof until the fourth section.
Nimmer, supra, at 39.
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‘original’ text.”25

Menard uses Cervantes’s text not as the

basis for his original expression, but as a constraining force,
much like a poet may voluntarily limit her own creativity by
employing the traditional rhyme and meter constraints of the
sonnet form.

Menard’s use of the “Quixote form”, so to speak,

does not facilitate or contribute to Menard’s expression; in
fact, it makes Menard’s ability to express himself almost
infinitely more difficult.
Consider, as an analogy to Menard’s endeavor, that of an
author attempting to write a novel in palindrome form.

Even the

most dexterous of authors can compose no more than a dozen or so
tortured lines of palindrome; a novel-length palindrome would be
an enormous undertaking.

If such a novel would be gripping,

insightful, and instructive as well, the accomplishment becomes
even more astonishing.

Each sentence the author adds to her

artistic expression must be carefully calculated to be
comprehensible forward and backward, and to contribute to the
story in both directions.

This substantial limitation to the

author’s artistic expression never determines that expression,
though it does tightly constrain the author’s choices.

In a

similar way, Menard’s constraint does not determine his
expression; the choices he makes are his own, and must be
25

Borges, supra, at 41.
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“reason[ed] out … in an irrefutable manner.”26

This is the force

of the second part of the law.
That Menard succeeded—even for just a chapter or two—in his
goal is amazing.

Menard was able to express his views on life

in the twentieth century; he was able to generate, from his own
subjective realm of interiority, the same words used by
Cervantes three hundred years before.

No longer should we be

surprised by the “draft upon draft”, or the “thousands of
manuscript pages” Menard tore up before achieving this small
part of his goal.27

The words must come, as it were, from his

soul; they must genuinely be all and only the words he would
have chosen to convey his insights and perspectives; and they
must be the same symbols used by Cervantes three centuries
before.

Had Menard merely copied Cervantes’s Quixote, he would

have had much less difficulty; the ratio of effort expended to
goals achieved is commensurate with what we would expect from
the difficulty of Menard’s task.

Indeed, if anything about

Menard’s Quixote is surprising, it’s not that he wrote so little
but that he wrote so much.
This is what allows Menard to claim (portions of) the

Quixote as his own: the independent and meticulous attribution
of meaning, of content, onto a particular formal combination of
26
27

id., at 41.
id., at 44.
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symbols on a page.

Menard’s Quixote and Cervantes’s Quixote

constitute different “expressions of ideas” precisely because
they are the expressions of different ideas.28

And, as in the

case of Keats and the magical poet described above, the
difference in meaning is ascertainable through the different
contexts of their lives and cultures.

For example, Chapter

Thirty-Eight (of both Quixotes) “treats of the curious discourse
of Don Quixote on arms and letters,”29 and Borges writes:
[i]t is well known that Don Quixote…decided the debate
against letters and in favor of arms. Cervantes was a
former soldier: his verdict is understandable. But that
Pierre Menard’s Don Quixote—a contemporary of La trahison
des clercs and Bertrand Russell—should fall prey to such
nebulous sophistries!”30
Borges concludes that the seeming anomaly must be attributed to
“the influence of Nietzsche.”31

We see here a clear example of

the meaning to the works being shaped by the context in which
they are written.

Elsewhere, Borges quotes the following

passage from part one, chapter nine of Don Quixote:
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository
of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the
present, and the future’s counselor.32
28

29
30
31
32

More precisely, they are different works because of the different origins
of their meaning. Had Menard’s Quixote had a meaning identical to
Cervantes’s, though still derived from Menard, the works would still
have different origins. Indeed, Menard contemplates (but ultimately
rejects as uninteresting) a method aimed at replicating Cervantes’s
meaning. Borges, supra, at 40.
id., at 42.
id., at 42.
id., at 42.
id., at 43.
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Borges dismisses Cervantes’s passage as “a mere rhetorical
praise of history.”33

But of Menard’s corresponding (some would

say, identical) passage, Borges writes,
History, the mother of truth: the idea is astounding.
Menard, a contemporary of William James, does not define
history as an inquiry into reality but as its origin.
Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is
what we judge to have happened. The final phrases…are
brazenly pragmatic. 34
Indeed, so drastic is the difference between the two works that
Borges finds Menard’s Quixote to be qualitatively superior:
subtler, more profound, and more artistically accomplished than
the textually-identical work by Cervantes.

“Cervantes’s text

and Menard’s are verbally identical, but the second is almost
infinitely richer,”35 we are told, and Menard’s Quixote is
“interminably heroic,” “peerless,”36 and “astounding.”37
Menard has created two chapters of text, sometimes critical
of contemporary society, sometimes insightful of the human
condition, sometimes ironically subverting readers’
expectations.

The work is the result of years of careful

craftsmanship and continuous revision.

The text is,

intentionally, word for word identical to chapters of Miguel de
Cervantes’s Don Quixote, but Menard takes great care not to
borrow any of Cervantes’s expression.
33
34
35
36

id.,
id.,
id.,
id.,

Cervantes never places

at 43.
at 43.
at 42.
38.
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words in Menard’s mouth, so to speak; the phrases Menard uses
are carefully chosen to express Menard’s subjective impressions,
chosen according to rules that force Menard to reason through
every decision independently.

Menard’s first rule of

construction allows him to contemplate many possible alternative
phrases to express his ideas.

His second rule of construction

forces him to “irrefutably” justify the selection of one phrase
over possible alternatives.

Together, these rules ensure that

each turn of phrase contemplated by Menard during the writing of
the novel originates from his own subjective realm of
interiority.

Menard does not “recast” Cervantes’s Quixote in

some other form; his goal is to create another Quixote, by
carefully assigning meaning to form without being influenced by

Cervantes’s prior assignations.

Menard’s work is the expression

of his views, his attitudes, and the context of his environment—
an expression that originates wholly from his own subjective
impressions and experience.
It may, of course, happen that some phrase or sentence
expresses the same meaning in Cervantes’s Quixote and in
Menard’s.

This is not problematic: so long as Menard has

followed his two rules, the correspondence in meaning between
the two expressions will truly be fortuitous.
37

The

id., 42.
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correspondence was not necessary, but the contingent result of
two independent assignments of meaning to text.
Menard’s Quixote is unique in the annals of literature, and
it is not surprising that we do not have a name for it.

I will

coin the somewhat oxymoronic term “independent recreations” to
refer to art that, while formally identical to pre-existing art,
nevertheless originates from the artist’s “subjective realm of
interiority.38
How can U.S. Copyright law deal with Menard’s two-plus
chapters?

To make the issue more pressing, imagine again that

instead of Don Quixote, Pierre Menard writes Jurassic Park,
chapter for chapter, word for word.
a cause of action now?

Would Michael Crichton have

Before you respond, reconsider the

lessons of the previous section: if the assignment of meaning to
chosen symbols originates from the subjective impressions of the
author, then it is an “original work of authorship.”39
The Supreme Court has held that “[o]riginality does not
signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous,
not the result of copying.”40 The Feist Court and Learned Hand
both provide a rudimentary guide for assessing originality:
38

39
40

We can imagine other possible “independent recreations,” such as William
Faulkner’s Huckleberry Finn, James Joyce’s The Gospel According to
Luke, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.’s Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.
See p. 7, infra
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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fortuitous similarity is original, but copying is not.

But both

Courts fall prey to a false dichotomy: they assume that
“resemblance through chance” and “resemblance through copying”
exhaust the reasons why two works may resemble one another.

As

we have seen, Menard’s Quixote fits into neither category.
Unlike Hand’s “magical author,” Menard is well aware of
Cervantes’s Quixote—in fact it is Menard’s intention that his
text be identical with Cervantes’s.

At the same time, Menard’s

Quixote is not a transcription, reproduction, or copy—it is a
new work painstakingly crafted by Menard, the creative
expression of his unique perspective and social context.

Again,

as I have argued, Menard’s turns of phrase are chosen not for
their formal identity to Cervantes’s work; indeed, Menard’s own
rules force him to ignore this fact.

Instead, Menard selects

symbols in order to express ideas that are at times shockingly
different from the ideas expressed by Cervantes.

Menard may be

justly accused of reinventing the wheel, but “reinvent” the

Quixote is exactly what he did; he did not copy it.
Justice Hand writes that an author “is not a tortfeasor
unless he pirates his work.”41

Menard meticulously avoids

incorporating Cervantes’s expression into his own writing, while
operating under enormous formal constraints—pirates seldom work
so hard.

Menard’s Quixote is original in the sense that his
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expression—his use of formal elements to convey content—
originated from a reaching into his own subjective realm of
interiority.

It is original, too, in that his artistic

expression is distinguishable from Cervantes’s.

His is an

original work of authorship cognizable under traditional
copyright law.
But does Menard’s Quixote qualify as a derivative work?

If

so, then regardless of its originality and meaning, it infringes
upon the work from which it derives.

Though the question of

derivative works appears different from the question of
originality, they are in fact identical.

It is expression that

merits copyright protection—not text, nor meaning, but the use
of text to convey meaning.

I may write a novel exploring the

same themes and messages as To Kill a Mockingbird—this in itself
is no infringement.

Harper Lee’s copyright prohibits me from

copying his expression—in other words, I cannot use Lee’s “form”
to explore Lee’s “content”.

This is the rationale behind

Holmes’s declaration that “[o]thers are free to copy the
original.

They are not free to copy the copy.”42

Holmes

suggests that while I may paint my own portrait of Whistler’s
mother, I may not paint a portrait of Whistler’s Mother.43
41
42
43

If I

Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
That is, I may not paint a version of Whistler’s artistic expression,
though if I happen to arrive at a similar expression through my own
marriage of form to content, then this is unobjectionable.

Daniel.Connolly@aya.yale.edu

18

use new form to convey Lee’s ideas, the result is new expression
and is protectable.

Lee’s expression.

But I may not use a new form to convey

For example, I may not translate To Kill a

Mockingbird into German, or write a sequel.

Such a work would

be not an expression of an idea, but an expression of an
expression—a copy of a copy.
the original.

But Menard’s Quixote is not an expression of

Cervantes’s work.
ideas.

And such a work is derivative of

It is not even an expression of Cervantes’s

It is an expression of Menard’s own subjective

experiences and impressions.
To examine the question from another angle, consider the
definition of a derivative work contained in the 1976 Copyright
Act: “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works.”44
work?

Is Menard’s Quixote “based on” Cervantes’s

Menard’s two rules of composition prevent him from

relying upon Cervantes’s Quixote either to determine the
subjective content of his expression or to choose the particular
form of that expression.

Cervantes’s work provides the space

within which Menard’s expression can occur, but it does not
directly influence Menard’s expression itself.

Menard’s work is

no more “based on” Cervantes’s than every modern sonnet is
“based on” the Shakespearean prototype.
44

17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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Let’s not be blind, however, to the irony of Borges’s
story.

Menard’s goal was quixotic—an impossible dream.

He “set

himself to an undertaking which was exceedingly complex and,
from the beginning, futile,” understanding that he “should…have
to be immortal to carry it out.”45

We needn’t worry about any

independent recreation knock-offs of John Grisham books hitting
the market soon—the likelihood of even Menard’s partial success
is infinitesimal.

But consider the lessons learned:

Similarity

between artistic expressions is not a matter of mere form, but
of the way in which the formal elements are used to convey
semantic content.

And an intention to achieve formal similarity

with another artistic expression does not by itself constitute
piracy.

These twin concepts will carry us some distance in our

consideration of the more common cases of parody and satire in
the next section.
Parody and Beyond
As mentioned above, I may write a new novel expressing the
ideas explored in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird.

Might I

not alternatively use the icons, the symbols, and the other
formal elements of Lee’s novel to explore different themes and
messages?

Isn’t this also to create an expression different

from Lee’s?
45

Borges, supra, at 40, 43-44.
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This is the controversial question central not only to
parody, but also to satire and to many of the appropriation
arts.

Unlike our “intentional recreations,” both parody and

satire have only a partial similarity to elements of an earlier
text.

But, as with Menard’s Quixote, the similarity is highly

intentional.
Courts tend to agree that parody, a time-honored form of
expression,46 should be protected and encouraged as “promoting
the progress … of useful arts.”47

But under current case law,

judges assume that parodies and satires are derivative works and
focus on determining whether they fall under either a “free
speech” or “fair use” exception to copyright infringement.
Parody is generally found to constitute a “fair use” exception
to infringement, while satire is not.
Under current case law, important to a determination of
fair use is a work’s “function” or “purpose”.48

Parody mimics an

earlier work with the purpose of criticizing or commenting upon
that work, whereas satire mimics an earlier work to criticize or
comment upon society in general.

Moreover, “[p]arody needs to

mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to
use the creation of its victim’s…imagination, whereas satire can
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the
46
47
48

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
U.S. Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574.
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very act of borrowing.”49

To criticize a work, the parodist must

make use of that work; but to criticize society, the satirist
may make use of any number of works.

Complicating any judicial

standard is “the fact that parody often shades into satire…, or
that a work may contain both parodic and non-parodic elements.”50
Even when a work is perceived to be a parody, its license
to use elements from the earlier work is not unlimited.

Under

current standards, even when a work is deemed to have a parodic
purpose, a further question must be asked: whether the parodist
has appropriated more of the parodied work than was necessary to
achieve the parodic purpose.51

In addition, courts look to the

“substitution effect”, or the degree to which the alleged parody
may prove to be a market substitute for the original.52
But remember: our invented genre of independent recreations
did not require an “exception” to copyright law in order to gain
protection.

The theory underlying copyright law naturally

extends protection to independently-created artistic
expressions, so long as they are “expressions of ideas” and not
“expressions of expressions.”

No consideration of critical

purpose, of amount of material copied, or of market substitution
is needed to ground protection in Menard’s hypothetical Quixote.
49

id., at 574.

50

id., at 574.
id., at 574.
id., at 574.

51
52
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Rather, Menard’s Quixote is the result of Menard’s “reach[ing]
into the subjective realm of interiority,”53 “essay[ing]
variations of a formal and psychological type,”54 and selecting
from among these variations “in an irrefutable manner.”55

Can

simple parody similarly be understood as a “partial independent
recreation”?

Can parody be reconceptualized as a non-infringing

original work of authorship rather than as a non-original
exception to infringement law?
To begin, let’s define a “simple parody” as a work using
formal elements of a target work solely in order to criticize
that target work.

Imagine a parody of Jurassic Park; instead of

Professor Hammond, the greedy theme-park loving mastermind of
genetic reconstruction, we are presented with Professor
Crichton, a greedy, Hollywood-loving pop writer.

His goal is

not to recreate living dinosaurs, but to create digital
dinosaurs on film.

He enlists the aid not of Ian Malcolm and

Dr. Alan Grant, but of Steven Spielberg and writer David Koepp.
Spielberg and Koepp warn Crichton that his obsession with
digital dinosaurs will wreak havoc with the things that should
truly be important to him—things like character and plot.
Crichton heedlessly rushes forward with his insane plan.

But
He

discovers to his dismay that he is unable to control his digital
53
54
55

Nimmer, supra, at 39.
Borges, supra, at 41.
id., at 41.
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dinosaurs, and they break loose not to maim and kill, but to
steal scenes and ham it up in front of the camera.

Spielberg,

Koepp and Crichton barely escape the film with their
professional careers intact.
Now I’m being needlessly harsh on a perfectly fine popcorn
movie, but I do so to illustrate the workings of parody.

As

with intentional recreations like Menard’s Quixote, my simple
parody is intended to be similar to its target.

The Jurassic

Park parody would not be word-for-word identical with the
target, and would only partially mirror that text.

The non-

mirroring elements of the parody originate unproblematically
from my own subjective realm of interiority.

The important

question is, have I “copied” the mirroring elements from
Crichton’s Jurassic Park?

Or have I “independently recreated”

them?
The answer to this question cannot be found through an
examination of the formal similarities alone.

Both Crichton’s

work and my parody are expressions (i.e., both use form to
express meaning); copyright law protects them as such.

If I can

“irrefutably justify”56 my selection of formal elements (or
justify them sufficiently to satisfy a civil burden of proof),
then I can establish that my parody is an expression of my own
56

id., at 41.
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subjective impressions, and not a derivative expression of
Crichton’s impressions.
How might I justify my selection of formal elements?

I

must point to the meaning, apparent and intended, underlying my
use of similar elements.

By showing that my use of the formal

elements carries a significantly different meaning than that
intended by Crichton’s use, I establish that the two expressions
have different origins.

By selecting Crichton to stand in for

Hammond, I imply that Crichton’s motives for writing are driven
by an obsession for fame and fortune.

Spielberg and Koepp

become the voices of reason, cautioning him against ignoring the
artistic needs of his narrative.

The scene-stealing dinosaurs

are the fulfillment of this danger.

While the elements found in

Crichton’s work are intended for narrative effect, the similar
elements found in my simple parody are intended to be critical
of Crichton’s endeavor—and they are readily understood as such.
The fact is, I do not rely upon Crichton’s expression: it
neither determines my selection of formal elements, nor does it
drive my assignment of meaning to those elements.

All this is

done by reaching into my own subjective realm of interiority.
Of course, but for Crichton’s work, my parody would not exist;
then again, but for Shelley’s Frankenstein, Doyle’s The Lost

World, and copyrighted works by Bradbury, Asimov, and Clark,
Crichton’s book would not exist.
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As I have illustrated, the simple parodist does not express
the target author’s expression.

A key to determining this fact

is that the meaning conveyed by the parodist’s use of form is
quite distinct from the meaning conveyed by the author of the
target work.

A character in the target work may represent

strength and nobility, while a similar character in the simple
parody is constructed to convey something quite different: often
a disgust with the target character, or a skewering of his
values and ideals.

This difference in meaning provides evidence

that the two expressions are distinct.

Simple parodies

generally constitute original works because the critical meaning
of the mirroring elements originates with the parodist, in spite
of the intended similarity of those elements.
A simple parody is the clearest example of a partial
independent recreation.

Most perceptive readers readily

understand the difference in meaning between my parody and

Jurassic Park.
parody?

How much of the target work may I imitate in the

The answer to this question is simple: as much as I

have “independently recreated”.

In other words, the parodist

should be allowed to use any and all formal elements that she
can truly claim to have instilled with independent meaning.

An

extremely talented parodist may be able, like Menard, to produce
a parody that is word-for-word identical with the target work.
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(Like Menard, however, she should be prepared to justify the
similarities “in an irrefutable manner”57 before a judge.)
Where does this standard fit into traditional infringement
analysis?

Independent meanings of expressions relate both to

the similarity of works and to their originality (or “origin”).
Two expressions conveying different meaning are not “the same”,
even when the formal elements of the expressions are similar;
this is true of the dueling Odes, the dueling Quixotes, and the
dueling Jurassic Parks.

Consequently, courts should consider

not similarity of formal elements alone, but similarity of the
expressions as a whole.
Of course, when adopting a rule to guide judges and
litigants in infringement cases, we cannot turn a blind eye to
issues of practicality.

While Learned Hand has set forth the

general principles of originality in all their shining
theoretical purity, judges are not philosophers and need
something more earthy.

This does not mean, however, that the

theoretical basis of the originality standard should be left out
entirely.

In most infringement cases, a prima facie case for

infringement would still be made out based upon the common
criteria of similarity and access: given the relative
unlikelihood of encountering independently created Odes or

Quixotes, proof of access and similarity can justifiably give
57

id., at 41.
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rise to an inference of pirating.

Evidence for independent

meaning then becomes critical as a defense to piracy, in
determining whether the allegedly infringing work nevertheless
constitutes an independent creation.58

The parodic expression

(appropriately understood as the use of form to express content)
will be deemed to originate with the parodist exactly when the
connection of form to content derives not from the target work
but from the subjective experiences of the parodist.
Some commentators have argued that the primary theoretical
justification for parodies lies in their critical meaning.
This, in a sense, is exactly the case.

But not, as these

commentators suggest, because criticism constitutes a free use
exception to infringement (though it, doubtlessly, does).
Rather, parodies’ use of critical meaning (in place of the
meaning intended by the target author) is an instance of
“independent meaning” which more broadly distinguishes original
from derivative works.
Simple parodies are, of course, not the only partial
independent recreations.

The partial intentional recreation

model also provides a good framework for assessing more complex
works.

The Supreme Court acknowledged in Acuff-Rose that works

often contain both parodic and non-parodic elements.59
58
59

When

The burden of proving independent meaning may fall upon the parodist here.
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 581.
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should such works be considered original artistic expressions?
The same standard is employed: when the author has used the
similar elements to convey a meaning independent of the meaning

conveyed in the target work.

Independent meanings imply

independently derived expressions, and so long as the
“independent meaning” condition is met, the work counts as
original, non-derivative artistic expression.
Note that, in theory, this criterion does not require that
the meaning of the partial independent recreation be different

from the meaning of the target work; it must only be
independently derived.

In certain cases, determining the

independent origin of meaning may be quite difficult, requiring
testimony from the authors and, perhaps, expert testimony from
literary critics or theorists.

For many other cases, though,

the standard is quite straightforward: if the meanings of the
two expressions are different, they must have independent
origins.

In simple parodies, for example, the meaning attached

to the formal similarities found in the parody involves
criticism of the target text.
In this way, the desire to protect the venerable parody is
reconciled with copyright theory; no “exceptions” are required.
Parody, as a partial independent recreation, is entitled to
protection as an “original work of authorship”.

Note, however,

that my standard for analysis is in some respects stricter, and
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in other respects more lenient, than current law.

As discussed

above, the parodist must justify any use of similar formal
elements through the assignment of independent meaning; the
parodist may never rely upon the target author’s expression to
derive the meaning of her text.

In this way, my proposed

standard is harsher than the current standards governing parody,
which don’t require such “irrefutable” justifications once a
parodic purpose has been ascertained.

In yet other ways, the

independent meaning standard is more expansive.

Parodists are

not limited to the minimum use of similar elements required to
achieve parodic effect; rather, they may “use” as little or as
much as they assign independent meaning to.60

Also irrelevant

under the independent meaning standard is any consideration of
the “substitution effect” mentioned above.
But more significantly, the independent meaning standard
extends protection to categories of art not traditionally
protected by the court.

Consider another Jurassic Park

scenario: the obsessive mastermind this time is not John Hammond
but George W. Bush, and his insane plan is to recreate dinosaurs
in order to increase the United State’s supply of fossil fuels.
Expecting eco-friendly shills Al Gore and Ralph Nader to support
his plan to resurrect these extinct species, he’s surprised to
60

Technically speaking, under my interpretation the parodist doesn’t “use”
the original work at all, except as a formal constraint on his
creativity.
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find they object to his continued reliance on oil to solve
America’s energy crisis.
This Jurassic Park is not a parody; it does not comment on
Crichton’s work.

It is, instead, a social satire, lampooning

the ideological values of conservative Republicans.

As a

satire, it is not protected under current U.S. law.

Parodies

need to use stylistic elements of Jurassic Park to criticize the
work itself; but courts find that in the case of satire, the use
of a particular work is more arbitrary.61

The satirist could

have easily chosen Don Quixote, or Hamlet, as his vehicle of
satire.62
But if our standard is to be the independent attribution of
meaning to form, then the Jurassic Park parody is scarcely
distinguishable from the Jurassic Park satire.

Both originate

through the independent attribution of meaning to form, as
indicated by a readily discernable difference in meaning between
the two works and their target.
How far does the new standard go?

Does it apply to a work

that has no perceptable critical intent—either literary or
social?
61

62

Imagine I write a book about a crazed

See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580-581, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d
Cir. 1992).
Of course, if the artist’s purpose is, for example, to criticize the
shallowness of contemporary American art, he is arguably confined to
using a copyrighted piece of contemporary American art as his vehicle.
The particular piece selected may be arbitrary, but in order to express
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entrepreneur/scientist John Hammond, who creates an island theme
park filled with genetically-reconstructed dinosaurs that
proceed to run amuck and wreak destruction on a cast of
characters.

It’s not word-for-word identical with Crichton’s

novel, ala Menard’s Quixote, but I claim to have attributed
meaning to my characters, setting, and plot points independently
of Crichton.

I claim my work to be an expression of my own

subjective realm of interiority.

Is my work protected under the

proposed standard?
Yes and no.

The response to this question is complex.

In

theory, the standard is the independent attribution of meaning
to text.

If my neo-Jurassic Park is independently derived, as I

claim, then it qualifies for protection under the standard in
theory.

But the standard in practice is more limited.

Using an

independently derived meaning standard as I propose, as a
defense to piracy, requires a showing of an ascertainable

difference in meaning, under the assumption that such a showing
is objective evidence of the independent attribution of meaning.
My neo-Jurassic Park may possess an independent attribution of
meaning, without possessing much ascertainable difference of
meaning.

Thus, the standard in practice does not protect me

from Crichton’s infringement claim.

the artist’s subjective impressions, someone’s copyright must be
sacrificed—a fact that the Court fails to address in Koons below.
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In other words, whether the allegedly infringing elements
of my work possess an independent attribution of meaning is a
question of fact to be decided by the Court.

The facts that my

novel is similar to Crichton’s, and that I had prior access to
Crichton’s work, count as evidence against independent
attribution of meaning; the presumption swings against me.

In

the absence of readily discernable differences of meaning, the
only evidence in my favor is my own claim of independent
meaning.

But this claim is suspect, not only on the grounds of

bias and credibility, but also because an author is not
infallible in determining the source of his attribution of
meaning.63

Literary theory has long recognized that what the

author intends, and what the author thinks he intends, may be
two separate things.
Does the independent meaning standard allow traditionally
derivative works?
derivative.

Most derivative works are straightforwardly

Sequels and spin-offs rely upon the earlier

expression to provide content for the later expression—a
character’s traits or past, a world’s political or social
structure.

Films and dramatizations are explorations of the

content present in the original work.
63

Derivative works are

George Harrison had a good-faith belief that “My Sweet Lord” was the
product of his own subjective realm of interiority, though the court
later determined he had been subconsciously influenced by the song
“He’s So Fine.” Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,
420 F.Supp. 177 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).
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continuations or extensions of the author’s earlier expression;
their meanings, and their forms, derive from the initial works.
Some works, though, blur the line between “derivative” and
“original”; and unfortunately, the independent meaning standard
advocated here does not draw clear lines for judges.
commercial incorporate copyrighted material?
incorporate the plot from an old book?
melody of an old love ballad?

Can a T.V.

Can a new film

Can a rap song use the

The answer is left to the

discretion of the finder of fact: if an independent attribution
of meaning is found, then the work may be deemed a noninfringing independent creation.

But more is required than the

mere façade of meaning, a post hoc rationalization of piracy.
The expression must not hitch itself to the meaning of the
earlier text.
If the line is not clear to judges, it is also not clear to
authors.

At the very least, authors are on notice that any

intended similarity to existing copyrighted works must be
justified in Menard’s “irrefutable manner.”

But while authors

are thereby subject to heightened scrutiny by judges, they have
a certain degree of added freedom.

Writers of satire, and

appropriation artists who work by transforming existing art,
have some claim of right to their art, under the independent
meaning standard.
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To a large degree, a standard of ascertainable differences

in meaning coincides with the standard of the transformative
value of a work laid out in Acuff-Rose.

Of course, the Court’s

decision merely enhanced the importance of the transformative
value of a work in determining whether it involved a fair use
exception to copyright law.

I urge the adoption of a more

powerful standard that directly addresses the issue of the
originality of a text: the independent attribution of meaning to
form constitutes the separate, non-infringing origin of a work.
The Independent Meaning Standard Applied
The facts of Rogers v. Koons are this: a visual artist
appropriates the image of a couple with their puppies.

He

transforms the image into a three-dimensional sculpture, with
some alteration.

The sculpture is intended to convey

exasperation and bewilderment at the banality of middle-class
American culture and sensibilities—and most observers understand

the sculpture as such.

The sculpture has taken on a different

significance: the independent meaning behind the artist’s use of
the form is clear.
infringement.

The photographer of the image sues alleging

What result?64

The Court in Rogers v. Koons rejects the theory that such a
sculpture constitutes a “fair use” exception, since it is satire
64

Koons, 960 F.2d at 301.
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and not parody.65

Koons need not have chosen that particular

image to convey his message of disgust.66

Perhaps the Court is

correct to deny that Koons’s “String of Puppies” is a fair use
of Rogers’s photograph.

But the lesson of Menard’s Quixote is

that the Court never should have gotten as far as a
consideration of fair use.

Koons’s sculpture should qualify

under copyright law as an independent and original artistic
creation.

It is the result of his use of particular formal

elements to express his own independently derived subjective
impressions.

His application of meaning to the formal elements

of Rogers’s photo is evident to most observers, and independent
of any meaning Rogers himself intended to convey.

This

simultaneously indicates the independent origination of Koons’s
expression, and establishes a fundamental dissimilarity between
the two works.
Although the independent meaning standard requires some
subjective artistic discernment on the part of the finder of
65

66

id., at 310. “The problem in the instant case is that even given that
"String of Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic
society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph
"Puppies" itself.” Interesting in Koons is that the Court hits upon a
crucial issue, but fails to explore it thoroughly: “in looking at these
two works of art to determine whether they are substantially similar,
focus must be on the similarity of the expression of an idea or fact,
not on the similarity of the facts, ideas or concepts themselves.”
Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. However, the Court envisions an “expression”
as merely the formal elements of the work, divorced from the idea it
expresses. Such an interpretation of the word “expression” forces a
conclusion that Keats’s Ode and the Ode created by Hand’s author are
identical.
id., at 310.
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fact, such subjective discernments are already required in the
current case law regarding fair use, where judges must decide
upon the “purpose” and “nature” of the allegedly infringing
work, as well as the amount of borrowing “required” to achieve
parodic effect.

Though copyright law has trended toward the use

of objective measures, subjectivity continues to seep into
judicial opinions.

This fact is hardly surprising; it would be

more surprising to find a completely objective standard that
addressed all aspects of copyright theory satisfactorily.

After

all, artistic expression is the subject of copyright law, and it
is inherently and irreducibly subjective.
Conclusion
It is important to recognize the distinction between the
meaning of the text and the text itself.

Neither alone

constitutes artistic expression; the act of aligning meaning
with form is required.

This is the very definition of the word

“expression”.
Most cases of clear infringement involve the replication of
both text and meaning.

But where text and meaning diverge,

analysis of infringement must proceed with great care.

Works

with textual similarity to prior works may nevertheless be
original works of authorship recognizable under copyright law.
The telling question that must be answered to determine
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infringement is, whether the assignment of meaning to form is
the independent, subjective work of the putative author.
While the absence of ascertainable differences of meaning
does not by itself indicate a lack of originality, the presence
of ascertainable differences of meaning is indicative of a
different source of origin.

Independent meaning is one factor

that should be given important weight in determining the
originality of a work.
The use of an “independent meaning” standard to determine
when a work is original requires a change in the current
conception of copyright.

The standard extends protection to

satiric works and even serious works, so long as the use of
similar elements is accompanied by the expression of independent
meaning.

Extending protection to such works promotes the

“Progress of Science”, as transformative works continue to add
new ideas and perspectives to our collective social dialogue.
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